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NOTES
PURCHASE BY THE TRUSTEE IN BOND ISSUE FORECLOSURES
The foreclosure of trust deeds securing bond issues has been the source of a
large number of difficult problems, one of the most troublesome of which is the
adjustment of the relationship between majority and minority bondholders in
realizing on the mortgage security.' Upon default, the traditional procedure has
I The difficulties have been accentuated by the attitude the courts have assumed toward
bond issue foreclosures. Conventional rules derived from mortgage foreclosure cases have
generally been applied, and the reorganization phase of bond issues has been ignored. Thus the
courts have frequently denied minority bondholders the right to intervene in the foreclosure
proceedings, on the theory that the trustee represents adequately the interests of all bondholders. Palmer v. Bankers' Trust Co., 12 F. (2d) 747 (C.C.A. 8th 1926); Guaranty Trust Co. v.
623
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been to attempt a reorganization by means of a bondholders' protective committee with which the bonds are deposited.2 At a foreclosure sale the committee
is in a position of great advantage; it can use its deposited bonds to apply on the.
purchase price of the property, and need raise only enough cash to pay the distributive share of non-depositing bondholders and the expenses incident to sale
and reorganization. Because of the large amount of cash necessary, outsiders
are usually precluded from bidding at the sale. The danger to dissenters that
3
the sale price will be wholly inadequate is readily apparent.
In an attempt to protect the interests of the non-depositing bondholders, a
number of practices have been developed by the courts. An upset price may be
set; 4 confirmation of the sale may be refused unless the purchase price is adequate;s or confirmation may be refused unless the sale is made pursuant to a
fair plan of reorganization6 which offers an equal opportunity to participate to
all bondholders of the same class.7
A further attempt to solve this difficult problem is presented by the recent
case of Straus v. Chicago Title and Trust Co.,' in which the Illinois Appellate
Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 15 F. (2d) 434 (D.C.N.D. Ill. 1926); Chicago, G.W.R. Land Co.
v. Peck, 112 Ill. 408,435-436 (1885); St. L. & Peoria R. Co. v. Kerr, 153 Ill. 182, i96,38 N.E.
638 (1894); Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Lake St. Elevated R. Co., 173 Ill. 439, 459-460, 51
N.E. 55 (i898); American Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. i8o E. Delaware Bldg. Corp., 262 11.
App. 67 (1931). Similarly, foreclosure records lacked any indication of the existence of a bondholders' protective committee.
2 See Rodgers, Rights and Duties of the Committee in Bondholders' Reorganizations, 42
Harv. L. Rev. 899 (1929); Rohrlich, Protective Committees, 8o Univ. Pa. L. Rev. 670 (1932);
note, 43 Yale L. Jour. 330 (1933).
3 The amount to be received by the non-depositors is determined by-the amount bid at foreclosure sale. Inasmuch as there is practically no competition the bondholders' committee will
be able to name its own price, subject to the possibility of judicial review. The committee will
set the price as low as possible, to reduce the amount of cash needed to pay off the non-depositors.
4 For the development of the upset price doctrine, see Spring, Upset Prices in Corporate
Reorganization, 32 Harv. L. Rev. 489 (i919); Weiner, Conflicting Functions of the Upset
Price Doctrine in a Corporate Reorganization, 27 Col. L. Rev. 132 (1927); Kearns, Upset Price
in Corporate Reorganizations, 26 Ill. L. Rev. 325 (1931).
s Federal Title Guaranty Co. v. Lowenstein, II3 N.J. Eq. 200, i66 Ati. 538 (i933); Michigan Trust Co. v. Cody, 249 N.W. 844 (Mich. 1933).
6 Investment Registry v. Chicago & M. E. R. Co., 212 Fed. 594, 609 (C.C.A. 7th 1913);
Guarantee Trust Co. of New York v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 238 Fed. 812, 816 (D.C.E.D. Mo.
1916).
7 See

Rodgers, supra note

2, 901-902, and authorities there cited.
A minority bondholder, owning less than one per cent of the entire issue, appealed from an order denying him leave to file an intervening petition setting out
that a decree of sale had been entered three months before, and that no efforts had been made
to hold a sale. The petitioner sought to have the mortgaged property sold at a fair price to be
set by the court, and, unless the property was bid in at that price, sought to have the trustee
directed to purchase at the sale for an amount equal to the mortgage indebtedness. The trus-

8 273 Ill. App. 63 (1933).
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court held (i) the trustee under the trust indenture has the power to bid in the
property for the benefit of all bondholders, and (2) if no outsider bids the full
value of the property as fixed by the court, under some circumstances the trustee
is under a duty to bid in the property at the sale, and will be compelled by the
court to do so. This result was reached on the unique theory that the court of
equity was exercising its jurisdiction over trusts rather than over foreclosure
proceedings.
The power of the trustee to purchase the property on behalf
of all bondholders, in the absence of specific enabling provisions in the trust indenture, has been
both affirmed9 and denied.-0 No case admitting such power, however, has permitted or required its exercise over the objections of the trustee and the majority group. Heretofore the device of purchase by the trustee at the foreclosure
sale has been used only as a means of avoiding a cash payment to minority
bondholders, and as one possible way of forcing a plan of reorganization on them.
The prior decisions, moreover, have not enunciated a definite rule governing
2
all situations," as may have been the intention of the present case.
The decisions denying the power of the trustee to purchase at the sale ignore
tee contended that there was no provision in the trust deed giving him the power to purchase
the property for the benefit of all bondholders; that if he did make the purchase the bondholders would own the property as tenants in common, and innumerable title difficulties would
arise; and that even if he did have the power to bid the exercise of that power was discretionary
and immune from court interference in the absence of bad faith or gross negligence on the part
of the trustee. Hdd: order denying leave to intervene reversed.
9 Hoffman v. First Bond & Mortgage Co., 1i6 Conn. 320, 164 Ati. 656 (i933); Silver v.
Wickfield Farms, Inc., 209 Iowa 856, 227 N.W. 97 (1929); First National Bank v. Neil, 137
Kans. 436, 20 P. (2d) 528 (933); noted in 47 Harv. L. Rev. 358 (1933); Nay Aug Lumber Co.
v. Scranton Trust Co., 240 Pa. 5oo, 87 Aft. 843 (1913); Watson v. Scranton Trust Co., 240
Pa. 507, 87 At. 845 ('914).
The trust indenture may expressly authorize the trustee to buy the mortgage security for
all the bondholders. Sage v. Central R. R. Co., 99 U.S. 334, 25 L. Ed. 394 (1879); Etna Coal &
Iron Co. v. Marting Iron & Steel Co., 127 Fed. 32 (C.C.A. 6th 19o4); Real Estate Trust Co. v.
Pa. Sugar Refining Co., 239 Pa. 456, 86 Atl. 1074 (1913).
The bondholders may impliedly assent to a purchase by the trustee. Barnes v. Chicago,
M. & St. P. Ry., 122 U.S. I, 20, 7 Sup. Ct. 1043, 30. L. Ed. 1128 (887).
10Equitable Trust Co. v. U.S. Oil & Refining Co., 35 F. (2d) 508 (D.C. Wyo. 1928); Werner,
Harris & Buck v. Equitable Trust Co., 35 F. (2d) 513 (C.C.A. ioth 1929); Bradley v. Tyson,
33 Mich. 337 (1876); Detroit Trust Co. v. Stormfeltz-Loveley Co., 257 Mich. 655, 242 N.W.
227 (1932); Beckman v. Emery-Thompson Co., 9 Ohio App. 275 (i918).
11For example, it was said in First National Bank v. Neil, supra note 9, at 446: "A positive
and definite rule cannot be laid down as to when a court should make an order permitting the
trustee, under a deed of trust where specific authority is lacking, to bid on behalf of the bondholders under terms and conditions the court may fix, as such an order must necessarily depend on the existing facts and circumstances.".
12 Inasmuch as the case was not before the court on its merits but only on the denial of the
motion to intervene, much of the language of the opinion might well have been omitted. Its
inclusion indicates a desire by the court to settle the correct procedure to be followed in future
foreclosures.
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the suggestion that the foreclosure of a trust deed is substantially a proceeding
for the enforcement and liquidation of a trust, and stress instead the nondepositing bondholders' rights to be paid in cash. As was stated in Werner,
Harris& Buck v.Equitable Trust Co.:13
There was no power in the court to compel the holder of a single bond to participate
in a bid for the property, if he did not wish to do so; the rights of the bondholders were
measured by their bonds and the trust deed securing the same and any provision absent
therein authorizing the trustee to bid for and on behalf of the bondholders, there was n6
power in the court to confer such authority upon the trustee .... if the property is

sold at public sale he has a right to take his proportion of the best bid that can be secured in cash and cannot be compelled to become an owner of an undivided interest in
the property.
On this theory it would seem that even though the trustee did purchase the
property at foreclosure sale the dissenters could nevertheless recover their pro
rata share of the purchase price in cash.'4 Moreover, a state statute which authorized a trustee to bid at the request of the majority bondholders was held unconstitutional as impairing the obligation of contract. 5
Another objection to the trustee-purchase device is that serious title problems may arise. Upon purchase by the trustee it has been suggested that each
bondholder acquires an estate in the property which may be subjected to the
lien of judgments and dower or curtesy; as a result, the trustee will be unable
subsequently to pass a merchantable title to the property. It would seem, however, inasmuch as the trustee holds title to the property for the sole purpose of
liquidation by resale, that the bondholders have an interest only in the proceeds of the sale, and not in the property to be sold.,' This potential difficulty as
to title may also be avoided by the insertion of a provision in the decree of sale
that the bondholders' interest in the property is deemed to be personalty, and
the entire legal and equitable fee is vested in the trustee. Similar provisions in
trust instruments as to the nature of the interest of the beneficiaries have been
7
upheld.'
It has also been urged that the Statute of Uses would execute the trust and
vest legal title to the property in the bondholders, who might thereupon main.3 Supra note io,
at 514.
'4 Beckman v. Emery-Thompson Co., supra note io; but cf. Yondorf v. Newman, Ill. App.,
1933.
ist Dist., no. 36185, decided Dec. i1,
'sDetroit Trust Co. v. Stormfeltz-Loveley Co., supra note zo.
,6Pomeroy, Equity jurisprudence (4th ed. i918), § 992: "Where the trust is to sell the
corpus of the property and to distribute the proceeds among the creditors, legatees and the
like, the beneficiaries plainly acquire no proper estate in the original trust fund prior to its sale;
their right and interests attach to the proceeds of this fund, which are to be paid to or distributed among them." Cf. Rogers v. New York & T. Land Co., 134 N.Y. 197, 217, 32 N.E.
27, 34 (1892).

"7Duncanson v. Lill,

319, 155 N.E. 323

(1927);
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Ill. 528, 153 N.E. 618 (1926); Sweesy, Admx. v. Hoy, 324 Ill.

Aronson v. Olsen, 348 11. 26, i8o N.E. 565

(1932).
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tain an action for partition. Inasmuch as sufficient duties are imposed on the
trustee to make the trust an active one and not subject to the operation of the
Statute of Uses, however, it has been held that such a suit could not be maintained. x8
Several more serious objections may be made. It would seem that the power
of a court of equity to authorize a trustee to deviate from the terms of an orthodox trust should not be extended to allow deviation from trust deeds securing
bond issues. In the last analysis, an orthodox trust and a trust to secure a bond
issue differ inherently in nature; the latter is in substance a mortgage, 9 adapted
to the needs of large financing. The trustee in such cases is a nominal party, and
the courts should not be misled because he is described as "trustee.""' To extend
the function of trust deeds to situations not contemplated by the parties may
seriously cripple their commercial expediency.
Moreover, if it be insisted in the face of these arguments that the trustee has
the power to make the purchase, the broad language of the Straus decision
should be limited carefully. The opinion is perhaps open to the construction that
the trustee will be required to purchase in all cases where there is no bid by an
outsider at the upset price set by the court. This ignores entirely the possibility
that the majority may be able to refinance the property and pay the minority
the sum they would have received if an outsider had bid the upset price at the
sale. In such a case it would seem there is no sound justification for requiring
the trustee to bid at the behest of the minority.
If thus limited, the effect of the decision will be to allow the court to establish
and enforce an effective upset price. Heretofore, attempts to utilize the upset
price device in protecting minority bondholders have often proved futile."
Prices once set have in many instances been reduced by the court to allow committees to consummate purchases when they otherwise would have been unable
to do so. If in the future the majority is unable to purchase at a price fixed by
the court, under this interpretation of the Straus decision the property must be
bid in by the trustee.
Even where the committee cannot pay non-depositors on the basis of the
price set by the court, if a substantial majority of the bondholders agree to a
plan of reorganization which has been adjudged fair and offers the minority
equal rights to participate, the trustee should not be required to purchase. To
hold otherwise would increase substantially the potential "nuisance value" of
the dissenter's bonds.
16Hoffman v. First Bond & Mortgage Co., supra note 9; Yondorf v. Newman, supra note
14.

,9First National Bank v. Neil, supra note 9.
2oSee Posner, Liability of the Trustee under the Corporate Indenture, 42 Harv. L. Rev.
198 (1928); cf. Ettlinger v. Persian Rug & Carpet Co., 142 N.Y. 189 36 N.E. io55 (1894).
11Fearon v. Bankers Trust Co., 238 Fed. 83 (C.C.A. 3d I916); Sebree v. Cassville & W. R.
Co., 212 S.W. II (Mo. i9i9); Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Oregon & Pacific R.R. Co., 28 Ore.
44, 40 Pac. io89 (1895).
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The result in the Straits case is justified by the court as a method of maintaining the status quo until general business conditions improve, thereby protecting
the interested parties from the dangers of a forced sale in a depressed market.2
Although this object is commendable, the device adopted to effectuate it may
well involve a sacrifice of certain rights of the bondholders. If the maker or
guarantor of the bonds is solvent, purchase by the trustee at a high upset price
would reduce the deficiency judgment otherwise obtainable. Such a result might
be theoretically defensible as an attempt to protect the interest of the owners or
of junior liens, but as a practical matter the requirement of a bid by the trustee
will often operate to shut out such parties in cases where they might otherwise
have been recognized on traditional reorganization.
A significant problem raised by the present case is the possibility of reorganization subsequent to the purchase by the trustee for the benefit of the bondholders. The language of the opinion would seem to indicate that the trustee is
to hold and manage the property until an actual liquidation. Before that time
the trustee would be operating the property without the benefit of specific trust
directions, and would be forced to turn to the chancellor for instructions to avoid
the danger of personal liability.2 3 In effect, then, the court would be managing

the property, and the inefficiency of judicial management is well recognized.
While some of these objections might be obviated by including detailed terms
as to the administration of the trust in the decree of sale, it must be remembered
that the trustee is not selected primarily for his ability to manage the mortgaged
property.
If the trustee-purchase device is to become one step toward reorganization,
however, certain advantages over the present practice might be gained. For
example, an unquestioned 24 jurisdiction over the plan of reorganization, and
fees and expenses incident thereto, would be conferred upon the court. Where
the plan takes the form of liquidation by distribution of corporate shares or participation certificates, the courts nay still be compelled to face the vexatious
problem of determining whether new securities are being forced upon the dissenter.25
WALTER V. LEEN

Even at a subsequent sale by the trustee the market may still be low and the beneficiaries
may bid at the resale. Similar problems would then arise with respect to those who do not join
as in the present situation.

23Wahl v. Schmidt, 307 Ill. 331, 138 N.E. 6o4 (19o3); Prine v. Whitten, 87 Ind. App. 407,
158 N.E. 826 (1927); Ashley v. Winkley, 209 Mass. 509, 95 N.E. 952 (I911); Digney v. Blanchard, 226 Mass. 335, 115 N.E. 424 (1917); Knipp v. Bagby, 126 Md. 461, 95 At. 6o (1915);

Rogers v. Wheeler, 43 N.Y. 598 (1871).
24Such a reorganization would be part of the administration of the trust. Under existing
practice it has been thought that the court was without jurisdiction to examine the plan of reorganization.
2SThis question was raised in Coriell v. Morris White, Inc., 54 F. (2d) 255 (C.C.A. 2d 193);
note, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 697 (1932); cf. Canada Southern R. Co. v. Gebhard, io9 U.S. 527,3 Sup.
Ct. 363, 27 L. Ed. 1020f (1883).
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DOES A CORPORATION ACTING AS TRUSTEE HOLD IN
JOINT TENANCY WITH ITS CO-TRUSTEE?
The problem of whether or not a corporation acting as a trustee may be a
joint tenant with an individual acting as a co-trustee is interesting in view of an
apparent static situation in American legal theory.
The general rule is that two or more individuals acting as co-trustees will be
treated as joint tenants, and on the death of one, the legal title to the trust property passes to the survivor or survivors., This doctrine has been retained even in
jurisdictions which have abolished joint tenancy by statute.2 The retention is
due to the convenience of the doctrine of survivorship in the administration of
trust estates. Corporations, however, have never been considered as capable of
holding in joint tenancy with an individual.3 The reasons given for this result
are that there is no mutual right of survivorship because of the corporation's
perpetual life and that there is too great a difference between the legal ownership of the natural person which passes to his heirs and the legal ownership of
the corporation with its perpetual succession. 4
Of the few American decisions on the question of joint tenancy between individuals and corporations the most outstanding are Telfair v. Howes and Moore
Lumber Co. v. Behrman. 6 In the first, the testatrix directed her executors to pay
the residue of her estate to a corporation and a non-existent society. The court
held that since a corporation cannot hold in joint tenancy it could not take the
whole and that the testatrix therefore died intestate. In the latter case, A, under
contract with a corporation, furnished material and labor in improving property owned by the corporation and B, a natural person. When A sought to recover from B, he failed on the ground that B would be liable only if he held in
joint tenancy with the corporation and that a corporation could not hold in joint
tenancy either with an individual or another corporation.
' Daily v. Sherratt, 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 742 (1738);

§ 343.
2 1

i Perry, Trusts ( 7th ed. Baldes, 1929), 584,

Beach, Trusts and Trustees (I897), 217, § io4; i Perry, supra note 1, 584, § 343.

3Angell & Ames, Corporations (iith ed. Lathrop, 1882), 167, § 185;

I Beach, Supra note 2,
217, § 104; 4 Thompson, Corporations (3d ed. White, 1927), 45, § 2457; i Tiffany, Real Property (2d ed. 1920), 625, § 191.
4Dewitt v. San Francisco, 2 Cal. 289, 290 (1852); Tiffany, supra note 3. See Bennet v. Holbeck, 2 Wms. Saunders 319, note 4, 85 Eng. Rep. 1113 (1682) where it is said, "And this jus
accrescendi ought to be mutual; which I apprehend to be one reason why neither the king nor
any corporation can be a joint tenant with a private person. For there is no mutuality: The
private person has not even the remotest chance of being seised of the entirety, by benefit of
survivorship, for the king and corporation can never die."
But see Co. Litt. § 280 (Coventry, ed. i83o), where Coke expressly says that there may be a
joint tenancy without equal benefit of survivorship "as if a man lets lands to A and B during
the life of A, if B dies A shall have all by the survivor, but if A dies B shall have nothing." See
also § 296.
53 Rich. Eq. (S.C.) 235 (185i).
5 144 Misc. 291, 259 N.Y.S. 248 (1932).
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The only authorities relied on in the latter case were Blackstone 7 and the
English case of The Law Guarantee6 TrustSociety v. Governor & Co. of the Bank
of England.8 The decision in this case was reluctantly reached by a court that
felt itself bound by old authority.9 As a direct result, Parliament two years
later adopted legislation which allowed stock to be transferred to and held in
the name of an individual and a corporation which would be treated as holding
in joint tenancy with the individual.10 The question was completely settled in
England in 1899 by an act which empowered corporations to hold real and personal property in joint tenancy in the same manner as if they were individuals.Y
What the view of the American courts would be if the problem were presented
in the trust situation is conjectural, but in view of the New York decision, it is
quite probable that the old law would be followed. The attitude of the trust
companies is varying. Some consider the problem important, while others show
a complete lack of interest. It is an almost universal practice, however, to expressly provide in the trust instrument for survivorship in the trust company on
the death of the individual co-trustee."2

At one time a corporation was not thought capable of acting as a trustee.
The lack of conscience in which trust and confidence could be reposed by the
settlor, the inability of the court of equity to compel performance because the
artificial body of a corporation could have no conscience on which a court of
conscience could act, and the impossibility of imprisoning a corporation as a
method of enforcing equity's purely personal decrees were thought insurmountable difficulties.'3 But these technical rules have been overcome.' 4 The technicalities of joint tenancy do not seem as serious as these, and it is possible that
the common law may overcome them without the aid of statute.
GERALDINE W. LuTEs
7 2 BI. Comm. 148
8 24
9

Q.B.D. 406 (18go).

Willion v. Berkly, I Plow. 223, 75 Eng. Rep. 339 (1562); Bennet v. Holbeck, supra note 4.
55 & 56 Vict. c. 39, § 26.

zI Bodies Corporate Act, 62 & 63 Vict. C. 20. See In re Thompson's Settlement Trusts,
496.
[19o5] 1 Ch. 229; Godefroi, Trusts & Trustees (4 th ed. Williams, 1915),
X2The following is a typical trust deed provision for survivorship in the corporation. "Upon
the death, resignation, refusal or inability of .................... to act as Trustee hereunder, the Trust
Company shall have, as sole Trustee, all title, rights, powers, duties, discretions and obligations
herein conferred upon and vested in said Trustees jointly."
'3

Perry, Trusts, supra note

2,

'4

Perry, supra note 2, 31, §

42;

§

42;

Lewin, Trusts

(12th

Lewin, sutpra note 13, 7.

ed. Dale & Streeton xgxl),

2.
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THE AFFIRMATIVE DOCTRINE OF MUTUALITY
The affirmative doctrine of mutuality has been stated thus: If one party to
a contract is entitled to specific performance, so ipso facto is the other, for the
equitable remedy if it exists at all must be mutual., The rule so stated would
never allow a situation where one party would get specific performance, and yet
the other party could not. But such situations exist and provide the basis for
the well established doctrine of lack of mutuality. 2 On the other hand, the
affirmative doctrine has been denied altogether, and it has been urged that the
true rationale where it has been seemingly applied is inadequacy of legal remedy.3 This explanation has been applied to those cases using the affirmative
doctrine to justify decrees giving the purchase money to the vendor in contracts for the sale of personalty4 as well as of land.S This denial of the doctrine
fails to consider (a) the fact that the vendor is relieved of the necessity of show-6
ing inadequacy of legal remedy in jurisdictions applying the mutuality doctrine
' Pomeroy, Specific Performance (3 d ed. X926), §§ 6, 165, cases cited; Williston, Contracts
§ 1443; Clark, Is There a Positive Rule of Mutuality?, 31 Harv. L. Rev. 271 (1917);
Horack, Specific Performance for Purchase Price, i Ia. L. Bull. 53 (1915); Cogent v. Gibson,
33 Beav. 557 (1864); Raymond v. San Gabriel Valley Land and Water Co., 53 Fed. 883 (1893);
Clark v. Cagle, 141 Ga. 703, 82 S.E. 21 (i914); Andrews v. Sullivan, 7 Ill. 327 (1845); Bumgardner v. Leavitt, 35 W.Va. 194, 13 S.E. 67 (i8gi); cases cited 36 Cyc. 565.
aThe doctrine of lack of mutuality has various formulations reaching divergent results because of different limitations of the situations to which each is applicable. But each formulation when applied denies specific performance to a party otherwise entitled to it, for, it is said,
the equitable remedy must be mutual. Fry, Specific Performance, (6th ed. X921), § 460: "A
contract to be specifically enforced by the court must, as a general rule, be mutual,-that is to
say, such that it might, at the time it was entered into, have been enforced by either of the
parties against the other." Ames, Lectures on Legal History (93), 371: "Equity will not
compel specific performance by a defendant if, after performance, the common-law remedy of
damages would be his sole security for the performance of the plaintiff's side of the contract."
Cardozo, J. in Epstein v. Gluckin, 233 N.Y. 490, 494, 235 N.E. 861 (1922): "What equity exacts
to-day as a condition of relief is the assurance that the decree, if rendered, will operate without
injustice or oppression either to plaintiff or defendant." See also Pomeroy, supra note x,
§ x63, 36 Cyc. 629; Cook, The Lack of Mutuality Rule, 36 Yale L. Jour. 897 (1927); Stone,
The Mutuality Rule in New York, 16 Col. L. Rev. 443 (1916).
As to the incompatibility of the two doctrines of mutuality as usually stated see Ames, op.
cit. 379; Clark, supra note z; Pomeroy, supra note i, § 65, n. (b).
3 Hodges v. Kowing, 58 Conn. 12, i8 AtI. 979 (1889); Eckstein v. Downing, 64 N.H. 248,
9 Atl. 626 (887); Horack, supra note i; Lewis, A Vendor's Right to Specific Performance,
41 Am. L. Reg. (N.S.) 65 (19o2); Walsh, Equity (1930), § 68.
4 Withy v. Cottle, x S. & S. 174 (2822); Adderly v. Dixon, i S. & S. 607 (1823); Cogent v
Gibson, 33 Beav. 557 (1864); Bumgardner v. Leavitt, 35 W.Va. 194, 13 S.E. 67 (1891);
cases cited Pomeroy, supra note i, §§ 6, 165; cf. Baker Machinery Co. v. U.S. Fire Apparatus
Co., ii Del. Ch. 386, 97 At. 613 (1915); Anderson v. Olsen, i88 Ill. 502, 59 N.E. 239 (19oi);
Peck v. Beacon, 272 Ill. App. 424 (1033).
S Walker v. Eastern Counties Ry. Co., 6 Hare 593 (1848); Raymond v. San Gabriel Valley
Land and Water Co., 53 Fed. 883 (1893); Robinson v. Appleton, 124 Ill. 276, 15 N.E. 761
(i888); cases cited Pomeroy, supra note i, §§ 6, 165.
6 McClurg v. Crawford, 209 Fed. 340 (913); Dollar v. Knight, 145 Ark. 522, 224 S.W. 983
(1920); Clark v. Cagle, 241 Ga. 703, 82 S.E. 21 (1914).
(1920),

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
and (b) the continued use of the language of mutuality by the courts. 7 Al-

though it is difficult to point to a case granting specific performance at the suit
of one whose legal remedies are clearly shown to be adequate, 8 it may be asserted
fairly that there is an affirmative doctrine of mutuality.9
But the affirmative mutuality doctrine as it exists differs from the broad
statement of it in that it is only applied where one party is entitled to specific
performance and the only possible objection to giving it to the other is adequacy of his legal remedy; for example, as in suits by the vendor for the purchase money.'0 Its application has not extended to situations where some positive objection other than adequacy of legal remedy stands in the way of giving
the remedy to the other party. Thus the mere fact that one party to a contract
could get specific performance has not sufficed to give it to the other who is
guilty of a fraud." It does not apply where only one party has signed a memorandum sufficient for the statute of frauds;- where one party is an infant who
has since the making of the contract attained his majority;13 where the state is a
7The influence of the mutuality doctrine is shown by the fact that specific performance has
been decreed for the vendor in a contract for the sale of land where he held notes for the purchase money. Andrews v. Sullivan 7 Ill.
327 (1845); Burger v. Potter, 32 Inl. 66 (1863).
8Horack, supra note i, suggests a contract for the sale of a second-hand watch having belonged to defendant's father would furnish a iest case for the mutuality doctrine. The very
fact, however, that the watch is second-hand would be likely to make market value in this case
no more than a concept, thus allowing the contention that the vendor's legal remedy is inadequate because damages are conjectural. Cf. 25 Mich. L. Rev. 546 (1927). A better test would
be a contract for the sale of a commodity with an open market, as cotton, desired by the purchaser for some sentimental reason, as its having been grown on an historic battlefield. Though
the purchaser's legal remedy is inadequate, such cotton being unique, the vendor can sell it
at market price and with damages recoverable at law get everything he bargained for.
9 Clark, supra note r; Ames explains the affirmative mutuality doctrine: "The vendor, from
the time of the bargain, holds the legal title as a security for the payment of the purchase
money, and his bill is like a mortgagee's bill for payment and foreclosure of the equity of redemption." Ames, supra note 2, 380. For criticism of Ames' view see Clark, supra note i;
Williston, supra note i, § 1443.
The Contracts Restatement (1932), § 372 (2), states the affirmative rule thus: "The fact
that the remedy of specific performance is available to one party to a contract is not in itself a
sufficient reason for making the remedy available to the other; but it is of weight when it accompanies other reasons, and it may be decisive when the adequacy of damages is difficult to
determine and there is no other reason for refusing specific performance."
10Cases, supra note 7. Durfee, Mutuality in Specific Performance, 20 Mich. L. Rev. 289
(1922), states the affirmative doctrine: "Complainant, although he had an adequate remedy at
law should be given relief if ....the other party would have been entitled to relief (provided
there was no affirmative objection to the relief sought in the case before the court such as
impossibility of compelling performance.)"
"Ames, supra note I, 373; Williston, supra note i, §§ 1435, 1525.
"2Hodges v. Kowing, 58 Conn. 12, i8 Atl. 979 (1889); Ames, supra note i, 373; Williston,
supra note i, § 1437. But see Duvall v. Meyers, 2 Md. Ch. 4oI (1850).
'3 Clayton v. Ashdown, 9 Vin. Abr. 393 (17x4); note, 43 A.L.R. 120; Ames, supra note I,
374; Williston, supra note z, § 1438.

NOTES
party; 4 and where the purchaser has become bankrupt;'s frequently it has been
held not to apply in bilateral contracts between fiduciary and principal. 6 Nor
has the fact that one party is entitled to specific performance been a reason for
decreeing specific performance of personal service contracts 7 or contracts the
supervision of which the court believes too difficult to undertake; 8 in such situations the negative rule is more likely to be invoked to deny specific performance
to either party.
It has been stated by eminent authority that after conveyance the vendor is
not entitled to specific performance.'9 It would seem, primafacie,that under the
formulation of the affirmative doctrine submitted, there is no other objection to
specific performance for a vendor who has conveyed except the adequacy of his
legal remedy, and that therefore he should be entitled to specific performance
unless the rule here given is inaccurate. But it should be pointed out that no
case has expressly refused the equitable remedy to a vendor who has conveyed
on the grounds that to do so would be inconsistent with the affirmative mutuality rule. Jones v. Newhall,2 the only case cited to support the proposition that a
vendor cannot get specific performance after he has conveyed,2 based its decision on the ground that the inadequacy of legal remedy provision in the Massachusetts statute makes it impossible to accept the affirmative doctrine of mutuality. And the objection to giving the vendor specific performance in such a
case is not merely that the legal remedy is adequate but that it is practically
identical with the equitable remedy, since nothing remains to be done under
the contract but the payment of the purchase money."2 Equity might well decline to exercise its jurisdiction to enforce a contract where it does just what is
done at law.
14State Highway Comm. v. Golden, 112 N.J.Eq. i56, 163 Ati. 551 (933).
"Contracts Restatement (2932), § 372, example 2.
,6 Ex parte Lacey, 6 Ves.625 (1802); Ames, supranote 1, 373; Williston, supra note i, § 1435.
17 Cases denying specific performance to a party otherwise entitled to it because of the lack
of mutuality doctrine are in point here, because if the affirmative doctrine is applied, both
parties would be entitled to specific performance. Pickering v. Bishop of Ely, 2 Y. & C.C.C.
249 (1843); Heth v. Smith, i75 Mich. 328, 141 N.V. 583 (2913); cases cited Pomeroy, supra

note x, § 164.
' Johnston v. Ry. Co., 3 D.G.M. & G. 913 (2853); Pac. Ry. Co. v. Campbell-Johnston, 153
Cal. io6, 94 Pac. 623 (19c8); cases cited Pomeroy, supra note x, § 164.
19Contracts Restatement (932), § 36o; Ames, supra note x, 380; Williston, supra note i,
§ 1443.
2015 Mass. 244 (2874).
2"The contract provided for the sale of shares in two land companies to be paid for in installments. The first four installments were designated as payment for the shares in one company,
the last installments for the other. After the shares in one company had been paid for and
transferred, the defendant refused to pay for the others. It was held the plaintiff was not entitled to specific performance because at law he could sue for the installment due, and that is
precisely what he could get at equity.
22Contracts Restatement (932), § 360, comment (e); Williston, supranote i, § 1443: "All
of these results would be sufficiently explained by saying that where the legal remedy secured
not only adequate redress, but practically identical redress with that which could be given by
equity, equity will decline jurisdiction."
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Where neither party to a contract has signed a memorandum sufficient for
the statute of frauds, but one party has done sufficient acts of part performance
to entitle him to equitable relief, there is an affirmative objection other than
adequacy of legal remedy to giving the other party specific performance, namely the statute of frauds. Thus, though language can be found in favor of applying the mutuality rule here,'23 it seems preferable to hold that the plaintiff must
bring himself within the reason for the rule of part performance. He would
have to show an irreparable change of position induced by the agreement, i.e.,
"equitable fraud,"24 or acts unequivocally referable to a contract, 5s or both,'6
depending on the requirements of the jurisdiction. But specific performance
may be granted because the acts of the other person constitute part performance, for the defendant's taking possession can be unequivocally xeferable to a
contract,27 and his acts, such as cutting the timber, may cause the plaintiff an
irreparable change of position28 but this is based on considerations entirely
different than mutuality.
The formulation of the affirmative doctrine here submitted does not conflict with the negative doctrine of mutuality which, regardless of how formulated, has never been used to deny the equitable remedy merely because adequacy of legal remedy might be an objection to specific performance. Thus a
purchaser has never been denied specific performance merely because his vendor's legal remedy might be adequate.29 Where the negative doctrine is invoked
to deny specific performance to a plaintiff otherwise entitled to it, the objection
to equitable relief on the defendant's part is some positive objection other than
adequacy of legal remedy, such as plaintiff's being an infant,3o compulsion of
personal services,3' or difficulty of supervision.32
SIDNEY ZATZ
"3Sweeney v. O'Hara, 45 Ia. 34 (1876); Clark, supra note i; Clark, Equity (i919), § 132.
The authorities cited by him do not necessarily support his proposition.
24Burns v. Daggett, i Mass. 368, 6 N.E. 727 (i886); Williams v. Carty, 20 5 Mass. 398,
91 N.E. 392 (igio); Slingerland v. Slingerland, 39 Minn. 197, 39 N.W. 146 (i888); 32 Yale L.
Jour. 89 (1922).
25Kine v. Balfe, 2 Ball & B. 343 (1813); Bradley v. Loveday, 98 Conn. 315, ri9 At. 147
(1922); Pomeroy, supra note i, § io8a; 32 Yale L. Jour. 846 (1923).
2 Maddison v. Alderson, L.R. 8 App. Cas. 467 (1883); Burns v. McCormick, 233 N.Y. 230,
135 N.E. 273 (1922).
'7 Kine v. Balfe, 2 Ball & B. 343 (1813); Price v. Hart, 29 Mo. 171 (1859); Morphett v.
Jones, i Swans. 172, i8I (i818).
28Inre Fay, 213 Pa. St. 428, 62 Atl. 99x (19o6); Latom v. Brooker, 51 Mo. 148 (1872);
Chambers v. Row, 36 Ill. 171 (1864); compare Pomeroy, supranote i, § io 5 . Where mere possession by defendant is sufficient part performance, the giving up of possession by the plaintiff should be part performance. Kine v. Balfe, 2 Ball. & B. 343 (1813); Pyke v. Williams, 2
Vern. Ch. 455 (703); Howard v. Patent Ivory Co., 38 Ch. Div. 156 (i888); Earl of Aylesford's Case, 2 Strange 783 (1727).
'9 Even Ames' statement of the negative rule does not consider this. See supra note 2. For
a statement of the negative rule that does consider this see 27 Yale L. Jour. 261 (1917).
30 Flight v. Bolland, 4 Russ. 298 (1829); note 43 A.L.R. 12o; but see Seaton v. Tohill, ii
Colo. App. 211, 53 Pac. 170 (1898).
3' See note 17 supra.
3' See note 18 supra.

